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Abstract 
The financial crisis has deeply affected European defence budgets and, as a consequence, the EU’s 
capability to act as a provider of global security. This paper assesses the extent to which pooling & 
sharing (P&S) of military capabilities is a viable plan to boost collective capacity-building and offset 
the heavy budget cut-backs,  drawing impetus from the NATO ‘smart defence’  agenda. Although 
multilateral cooperation is proven more efficient than the status quo through the lens of economics, 
and a set of external stimuli would facilitate deeper military integration, the paper acknowledges that 
a fully-fledged EU defence market remains difficult to attain due to short-term political and strategic 
considerations. However, piecemeal progress in specific areas is possible and viable, if political 
conditions are met. The last section  of the paper offers some policy recommendations towards  a 
pragmatic and feasible roadmap for P&S.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, warned in June 2011 that America could abandon 
NATO if current trends in the shrinkage of defence capabilities were not reversed (Traynor, 
2011). European defence establishments were then faced with a momentous and difficult 
choice: either the continent’s defence assets grow bigger, hence complying with alliance 
commitments, or they get smaller and cede to austerity pressures.  
It goes without saying that, under the present circumstances, no leader can float a rise in 
military spending without facing public criticism and an almost inevitable loss of support 
from  his/her  own electorate. And why is it necessary to increase  military expenditures 
anyway? Fears of a Soviet invasion vanished more than 20  years ago, together with the 
menace of a nuclear war in Europe. As for the threat posed by international terrorism, the 
EU’s role in counter-terrorism has privileged police and justice cooperation over the military 
approach: overall, EU member states tended to treat terrorism as an internal affair and were 
highly critical of the US military-driven concept of ‘war on terror’ (Keohane, 2005). In other 
words, with Europe facing no imminent threat, political arguments for increased military 
spending in an age of austerity are doomed to lose ground.  
On that account, significant defence cuts are not entirely surprising. In the UK, the coalition 
government’s 2010 strategic defence and security review (HM Government, 2010) entailed 
the biggest defence cuts since the end of the cold  war. Budget sacrifices included tough 
measures such as a fall in defence spending by 8% in four years, downsizing the army by 
around 7,000 troops, the scrapping of Harrier jump jets and Nimrod reconnaissance planes, 
and last but not least, the decision to decommission the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal well 
before the two new aircraft carriers under construction (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS 
Prince of Wales) will be ready to replace it. The latter measure implies that no plane will be 
able to fly from British aircraft carriers before 2019.  
What is also not surprising is that states have sought to decrease defence costs and increase 
efficiency through fostering bilateral or multilateral forms of cooperation with other states. 
Perhaps the most remarkable example is the defence agreement signed by the UK and France 
in London on 2 November 2010, involving unprecedented cooperation in the field of defence, 
including  shared facilities to test nuclear warheads, the sharing of aircraft carriers for 
training purposes and possible military operations, the creation of a joint expeditionary force 
and shared resources on training, maintenance and logistics of A400M transport aircraft. 
This form of cooperation, however, was not enough to prevent Europe from becoming the 
target of public criticism when the Anglo-French-led campaign in Libya ran out of 
munitions.  
To fend off a European retreat on defence matters, in August 2011, NATO (Rasmussen, 2011) 
called for more cooperation between European member states in buying defence equipment, 
training and specialisation of military tasks. The underlying logic of the ‘smart defence FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 2 
agenda’, whose implementation package will be presented at the NATO Summit in Chicago 
in May 2012, is straightforward: instead of pursuing costly national programmes, allies can 
seek more cost-effective solutions by pooling and sharing (P&S) resources.  
Burden-sharing is not a new concern in transatlantic relations. Nor is the idea of pooling and 
sharing of military capabilities in Europe (Biscop, 2005). What the two concepts have in 
common, however,  is that they appear to be a never-ending struggle, which has 
systematically failed to turn into concrete action. What is new is that the financial crisis, 
together with the lessons from the Libya campaign, have made it possible to link the idea of 
a fairer, hence more significant European contribution to NATO’s capabilities development 
to a ‘smart’ way to handle defence in an age of austerity through multilateral cooperation 
(Giegerich, 2006 and Valasek, 2011). Furthermore, the re-orientation of the US strategic 
interests  towards the Asian and Pacific regions is pressuring Europeans to refocus their 
approach towards the neighbourhood and to consider ways to upgrade and maintain hard 
security capacities without impacting on the fiscal deficit.     
These factors have triggered a revival of the discussions on the Europeanisation of military 
defence in the EU, boosted by the process known as the ‘Ghent Framework’  (Biscop  & 
Coelmont, 2011). Therefore, three important questions arise: first, what impact will this new 
transatlantic impetus have on the European Union’s defence market and, more broadly, on 
the Common Security and Defence Policy  (CSDP)? From an economic standpoint, is the 
current structure of the EU defence market conducive to  P&S? Third, what are the real 
prospects for deeper cooperation in a sector where national protection tendencies  and 
strategic interests are way too strong to allow for openness and liberalisation?  
This paper provides a detail investigation into why and how the rationalisation and 
optimisation of EU defence spending through pooling and sharing is needed, and what are 
the main obstacles Europe will face to put this agenda into practice. We argue that, although 
structural conditions after 2008 have become favourable so as to allow the EU to make the 
historical move towards deeper military integration, a fully-fledged EU defence system and 
market remains unattainable due to political and strategic considerations. At the same time, 
however, piecemeal progress is possible and viable, especially if boosted by a credible NATO 
call for ‘more Europe’.  
Our analysis is structured as follows. The first section defines pooling and sharing in the 
framework of EU defence markets and summarises the key points of the academic and 
policy debate. The second section explains why current circumstances make the P&S agenda 
likely to be implemented now, as opposed to previous unsuccessful attempts. The third 
section investigates the economics of EU military spending in order to clarify why P&S is 
necessary and what are the main weaknesses in the current EU defence system. Finally, the 
fourth section makes some recommendations towards a pragmatic and feasible roadmap for 
P&S.  
2.  EU POOLING AND SHARING: A NEW LOOK FOR AN OLD IDEA 
The definition of P&S essentially relies upon three components: pooling of procurement of 
weapons and services, or joint research facilities (e.g. the A400M transport plane); sharing 
through the partial or total integration of force structures such as training facilities, or setting 
up joint units; and specialisation. There have been some practical examples of P&S in Europe 
already: the Franco-British treaty of November 2010, which constitutes a bilateral P&S 
agreement; multilateral experiences such as the Visegrad four (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) and the Weimar triangle (France, Germany and Poland), although it is 
more appropriate to refer to them as small-scale initiatives that partly fit into the P&S model; 3 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
and, on the capabilities side, the EU Battlegroups, which are the most prominent example of 
‘pooling’  of EU member states’  troops.  Notwithstanding these initiatives, however, the 
operationalisation of a thorough EU P&S agenda depends upon two essential factors, which 
have yet to materialise: first, the effective liberalisation of the European defence market, 
leading to more competition among defence companies (hence removing national barriers) 
and the Europeanisation of part of the defence budget; second, significant improvements to 
EU defence cooperation with the aim of getting Europe’s diversified military hardware and 
technologies to talk to one another.    
Dating back to the 1990s, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU), the case 
for deeper armaments cooperation is an  old story, and definitely not a success story 
(Keohane, 2005). This is very much linked to three structural weaknesses of the EU defence 
system.  
Disparities in military spending among EU member states and lack of coordination have 
been deeply detrimental to EU security cooperation. The UK and France alone make more 
than 40% of public defence investments in the European Union. Other member states’ 
spending is quite frivolous in terms of their contribution to the virtual EU defence capacity. 
Consequently, the critical mass of EU defence capabilities is not ‘big’ enough, and national 
capacities are still to a large extent uncoordinated, especially when it comes to the acquisition 
of new technologies. Furthermore, collective military capabilities developed by member 
states since June 2004 (adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 setting  up the guidelines for 
capacity-building) have shown severe shortfalls and joint procurement projects have been 
jeopardised by national rivalries (Major & Molling, 2010). Two examples are highly 
significant. The EU Battlegroups, which are considered as the main success story of this 
process of capacity development (Lindstrom, 2007), have never been deployed and hence 
could not provide the operational experience (that is, a corpus of lessons learned) necessary 
to improve and push forward the capacity-generation mechanisms. A policy brief published 
by the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in December 2009 (Keohane & Blommestijn, 
2010) acknowledges that, compared to 1999, a slow progress could be observed on 
procurement plans such as the A400M and C-17 planes, Eurofighter, Joint Strike Fighter and 
Rafale jets and the Galileo satellite navigation system. However, it also pointed out that a 
number of capability weaknesses would continue to hamper the ability of the EU to project 
its military force, especially as far as strategic transport assets are concerned.  
Economic protectionism and geopolitical considerations also help explain the flexible 
geometry of defence cooperation to the detriment of defence integration, resulting in 
sluggish progress in terms of capabilities. “The crucial question here is what the rationale for 
cooperation is, and with whom. The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière 
d’Armements (OCCAR), for instance, brings together Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Germany 
and the UK to effectively manage (i.e. pool) specific collaborative armament projects, such as 
the A400M Tactical strategic airlifter or the FREMM programme (Fregate Europee Multi-
Missione). OCCAR has only been successful in achieving limited and targeted objectives 
with a limited number of participating countries. A bigger organisation could be much more 
difficult to handle and reduce efficiency in the delivery of defence equipment.  
The literature points up differences in national strategic cultures as a third ‘cultural’ hurdle, 
with major strategic and operational consequences. Strategic cultures affect the way national 
armed forces operate and underpin the military doctrines guiding different  states’ 
approaches to operational procedures and approaches. As noted by Christoph Meyer, since 
CSDP quintessentially depends on cooperation between national militaries in the planning FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 4 
and implementation phase of an operation, strategic incoherencies can lead to disorientation, 
unclear goals and hence delayed or ineffective action (Meyer, 2004). Divisions in terms of 
strategic cultures among EU member states revolve around three main dimensions: 
i)  Atlanticists (like the UK,  the  Netherlands  and  Central and Eastern European 
countries) vs. Europeanists (like France, Germany, Belgium or Finland); 
ii)  multilateralist countries (the vast majority of EU member states) vs. sovereignists 
(i.e. UK) and neutralists (i.e. Austria and Ireland) and 
iii)  concerning the attitude towards military interventions, countries that are prone to 
the use of force (namely former colonial powers such as France or Portugal) vs. 
tamed, pacifist powers (such as Germany and the Nordic countries) (Cardoso, 
2009).  
Strategic cultures intertwine with the size and capacities of national militaries, broadening 
the gap between big and small member states and affecting their security interests and 
priorities. The European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Union, 2003) drafted under the 
responsibility of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European 
Council on 12 December 2003, and the subsequent ESS Review (European Union, 2008) failed 
to lead to strategic convergence or Europeanisation, although they set the ground for 
identifying strategic areas of cooperation and helped ‘prioritise’ the security agenda of EU 
member states. However, both Meyer (2006) and Giegerich (2006) agree that important 
cultural and ideational cleavages between member state persist, namely across the 
Atlanticists vs. Europeanists and the pacifists vs. interventionists divide. 
That being said, three important developments have reinvigorated the debate on EU military 
integration through pooling & sharing over the past three years.   
First, the provision by the Lisbon Treaty of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as 
an instrument allowing groups of member states to cooperate more closely, thus attaining 
objectives that otherwise would be unattainable at 27. Second, the adoption of two Directives 
(43/EC in late 2008 and 81/EC in early 2009) aimed at simplifying procedures for moving 
military goods among member states and increasing the amount of defence procurement 
that is open to competition across the EU. Third, the adoption of the Ghent Framework in 
December 2010, under the Belgian Presidency, exploring the feasibility of intensified EU 
cooperation and P&S regarding military capabilities in areas such as training, logistics, 
medical, transport and communication. This was followed by the German-Swedish joint 
Food for Thought paper on “intensifying military cooperation in Europe”, which identifies 
the following areas as suitable for increased cooperation: research and development, 
acquisition, training and exercises, command structures and procedures, and operating costs.  
The Ghent Framework is particularly important insofar as it provides the ‘political umbrella’ 
for member states to exploit the groundbreaking potential of the two legal instruments 
(PESCO and Directives 43/81). The Ghent Framework, in fact, reengages the debate on 
defence budgets in Europe by reckoning that the answer to reduced  national defence 
budgets is sought in creating better (‘smarter’, to use NATO’s jargon) forms of cooperation, 
and hence going beyond previous ad hoc and circumstantial arrangement that did not solve 
the strategic shortfalls of the EU at their roots. The framework aims at identifying and 
assessing member states’ military capabilities according to three categories: i) capabilities to 
be maintained at the national level while at the same time ensuring increased 5 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
interoperability, ii) capabilities that offer potential for pooling and iii) capabilities that can be 
considered for role- and task-sharing.  
At is usually the case, new developments in the policy arena have stimulated the debate 
within the EU security and defence expert community.   
Bastian Giegerich (2010) reaffirmed the need for multinational collaboration in Europe to 
help manage defence in an age of austerity, drawing lessons from previous initiatives. 
Giegerich acknowledges that the major limitation of these collaborative projects lies in their 
moving at the speed of the slowest participant, as well as in the fact that concerns about the 
loss of national autonomy and industrial capacity stand constantly in the way. Four issues, 
however, are considered as making collaboration productive: transparency about project 
risks, a strategic approach over the lifetime of capabilities, the harmonisation of hardware 
requirements and depoliticised decision-making.   
Biscop & Coelmont (2011) have stressed the need to use Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) to implement the Ghent Framework and set up a permanent capability generation 
conference, with  the aim of creating  a  durable strategic-level framework for systematic 
exchange of information on national defence planning. PESCO is seen here as the only 
instrument allowing member states willing to subscribe to the permanent process to go 
further without having to face stumbling blocks from those that are not. If configured in a 
way so as not to divide the Union, and if supported by a critical mass of member states 
willing to develop new collective capabilities that are currently not available to the EU, the 
potential of PESCO is far-reaching: it could help set new defence objectives and guidelines 
and even improve relations with NATO and its evolution towards a two-pillar alliance (US 
and EU), whereby the US loses influence but gains in terms of burden sharing.  
Other authors have put the emphasis on the effective liberalisation of the EU defence market 
by having Presidencies bolster the implementation of Directives 43 and 81 (O’Donnell, 2011), 
or on the Europeanisation of part of the defence budget and the communitarisation of 
missions funding (Liberti, 2011). Valasek (2011) suggests the formation of “islands of 
cooperation”, throughout the formation of multiple, regional islands whose members will 
partly integrate their militaries,  hence developing tailored strategies for discrete parts of 
Europe (a geopolitical vision of the relationship between PESCO and the Ghent Framework). 
Finally, in terms of what capabilities are more suitable for pooling, the European Defence 
Agency has suggested that P&S should be enhanced particularly for dual-use (military and 
civilian) technologies, such as satellite communications, logistical support (i.e. naval) and 
medical support (EDA, 2011).  
Having reviewed the key issues in the academic and policy debate, as well as the main 
weaknesses in the EU defence system, the next section  clarifies what makes the current 
situation different vis-à-vis previous attempts to establish a European armaments market.   
3.  THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: WHY POOLING & SHARING IS NO 
LONGER TABOO  
As the previous section has shown, three endogenous factors – the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the adoption of the Ghent Framework and the two directives on the EU 
defence market – have led to a reappraisal of P&S. A crucial question arises as to how the 
current call for intensified armaments cooperation in Europe is different than the previous 
disappointing attempts. Is optimism justified with respect to an issue that has for a long time FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 6 
been considered as taboo? Three external stimuli support such optimism: i) the eurozone 
crisis and its impact on defence budgets, ii) the military lessons from Libya and NATO’s (US) 
call for multilateral cooperation on defence capacity-building and iii) the future of the global 
defence industry and the transition towards a multi-polar world.  
3.1  In times of austerity, inefficiencies are no longer acceptable 
The eurozone crisis and its impact on defence budgets provide a first, major stimulus to 
consider P&S as an alternative to individual member states’ declining military spending. The 
downgraded situation of EU military capacity is not a new development. Since the early 
1990s, European countries started cutting dramatically their defence budgets, as shown by 
Figure 1. Peace was restored, the Russian menace disappeared and all countries could in the 
end benefit from the ‘peace dividend’. European defence budgets suffered an average fall by 
16% in just five years, making precious resources available for other economic sectors. From 
an economic point of view, there is no doubt that this process fostered growth and helped to 
consolidate the European liberal project, generating peace and stability in the region. This 
process led to a dismantling of the former military structures in favour of smaller, well-
trained, more easily deployable and flexible units more adapted to the current conflicts. This 
resulted in a decline of military capabilities in relative terms.  
Figure 1. European historical military expenditures 
 
Source: SIPRI, 2012. 
However, over the last decade (2000-10), military expenditures started soaring again, notably 
as a result of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Western and Central Europe (that is, the vast 
majority of EU and NATO members) saw an increase of 6.4% in real terms between 2000 and 
2009. Although such an increase could be understood as an indicator of a renewed role of 
Europe in international security, the comparison with other global actors shows an opposite 
picture. European military expenditures are in fact rather negligible if compared with the 
world jump by 42.3% in real terms. During the same decade, the US and China increased 
their spending by 64.7% and 188.8%, respectively (only Japan reduced its expenditures by 
230,000 
240,000 
250,000 
260,000 
270,000 
280,000 
290,000 
300,000 
310,000 
320,000 
U
S
D
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
a
t
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
2
0
0
9
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 7 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
3.1% in real terms). In 2010 US military spending represented 43% of the world total, with a 
military burden that amounted to 4.8% of its GDP: despite the NATO target of 2% of GDP, in 
2009 only six EU countries (the UK, France, Estonia, Portugal, Bulgaria and Cyprus) were 
above this threshold (Figure 2).  
The situation of European defence capability has seriously deteriorated after 2008, with the 
arrival of the financial crisis. In order to respond to the market pressures and to secure their 
state budgets, most European governments have been forced to reduce their spending: this 
trend, detectable in 2010 budgets, will continue and perhaps will deteriorate in the coming 
years, especially for those countries that are in the eurozone and have progressively high 
debt levels. The EU on the whole, but especially the eurozone countries, will face in the 
coming decade high pressure on public finances and slow economic growth: in a period of 
scarcity, resorting to defence cuts represents an easy way for the governments to cut their 
expenditure without impacting too much on their popularity. 
Figure 2. Public defence spending in the EU, 2010 
 
Source: SIPRI, 2012. 
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An empirical demonstration of this sentiment can  be found in the survey “Transatlantic 
Trends 2011” (Figure  3), conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
(GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo: the majority of the EU respondents were in favour 
of maintaining (46%) or decreasing (34%) defence spending, with a paltry 17% opting for an 
increase; the United States displayed a fairly similar pattern (45% maintaining, 34% 
decreasing, 19% increasing). Obviously these responses are informed primarily by popular 
sentiment rather than a precise calculation of the pros and cons of each  policy  option 
presented. For a national budget, defence is one the few elements in which a cut in spending 
does not represent a hard deed, especially because most of the expenditures are devolved to 
investments, having deep effects only in the future. In addition, defence is often seen by the 
population as a remote or even unethical business: the  two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were largely unpopular in Europe: this led to the belief that is better to deploy resources to 
address internal difficulties rather than sort out problem far away from one’s own country. 
Figure 3. Public opinion about defence expenditure policy 
 
Source: Transatlantic Trends (2011). 
The declining trend is visible in the data shown in Table 1: this tendency appears to be very 
critical because defence capabilities can quickly erode, but are very slow and difficult to 
rebuild. Despite a common declining trend in the EU (an average of 5.9%), the impact of the 
budget pressures differs significantly across member states, pointing to different degrees of 
national importance given to defence policy. Despite the fact that defence has always played 
an important role in UK national policy, this relevance did not prevent the government from 
making strong cuts: the British defence budget will cope with 8% cuts between 2011 and 
2014, implying decommissioning of aircraft carriers, the retirement of Harrier jets, delays in 
the modernisation of Trident submarines and the withdrawal of all British troops from 
Germany. Also France, despite its strong nationalist interest, had to make deep savings 
(roughly €3.5 billion in the period 2011-13), imposing for instance, a reduction of 8,000 
employees in the Ministry of Defence and delays in the upgrading process of Mirage jets. 
The German Minister of Defence has implemented a €8.3 billion programme of spending 
cuts between 2011 and 2014, with a reduction of manpower from 250,000 to 185,000 and the 
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cut its budget by 10% between 2011 and 2014: this cut has entailed a reduction in its 
Eurofighter command by 25 aircrafts (over a total of 121 jets) and in its order of frigates.  
Table 1. European defence cuts: Military expenditure (% change in real terms) 
  2009-10  2010-11      2009-10  2010-11 
Austria                         4.4  -5.9    Latvia                          -24.2  2.7 
Belgium                        -4.5  -1.9    Lithuania                       -15.8  -1.2 
Bulgaria                        -4.9  -19.2    Luxembourg  N/A  N/A 
Cyprus                          3.9  3.3    Malta                           2.6  0.0 
Czech Rep                     -9.2  -9.8    Netherlands                    -3.7  -2.9 
Denmark                        6.5  0.2    Poland                          4.4  4.2 
Estonia                         -23.1  1.8    Portugal                        3.7  -11.1 
Finland                         -2.1  7.5    Romania                         -7.9  -6.8 
France                          -8.7  -1.4    Slovak Rep                     -12.6  -14.3 
Germany                         -1.5  -3.5    Slovenia                        -0.5  -13.5 
Greece                          -32.1  4.7    Spain                           -10.5  -5.2 
Hungary                         -10.3  -4.7    Sweden                          8.2  1.3 
Ireland                         -4.7  -5.3    UK                              -2.1  -0.4 
Italy                           -4.2  -10.1    EU AVERAGE  -5.7  -3.5 
 
Note: Countries in bold are members of the eurozone. 
Source: SIPRI, 2012. 
 
Despite a common trend of defence cuts, there are nevertheless some positive exemptions: 
Denmark plans  to increase its military budget by 8% in the period 2010-14,  the  Polish 
government increased its  2011 budget by 7% (notably in the investment sector, with an 
increase of 16%) and Sweden decided to keep defence budget steady until 2014, abolishing 
conscription at the same time.  
All three countries currently receiving international finance assistance (Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal) have made significant reductions in their military budgets, facing losses in their 
military capabilities. These cuts have a particular significance for Greece, due to the 
importance of defence in this country: it has, in fact, for a long time ranked first in Europe for 
the percentage of GDP committed to defence (3.2% in 2009) due to longstanding tensions 
with its rival, Turkey and, with a population of just 11 million, is the largest importer of 
conventional weapons in Europe. Despite the country’s slide  into recession, the  national 
budget rose nominally by 5% in 2009 but then declined by 7% in 2010 and the planned 
reduction for the coming years amount to €330 million. The equipment budget lines up to 
€1.8  billion,  providing  just enough resources to maintain the existing efficiency, without 
planning new acquisitions and delaying past programmes. In a situation of growing 
instability in Cyprus, and especially in the face of no comparable cuts in Turkey’s defence 
budget, the implementation of austerity measures, agreed in the international bail-out plan, 
appears to be politically expensive for the Greek government.  
This situation is particular risky in Europe, since national defence policies are still too much 
tied to cold war schemes: many EU armies, for example, are based on national conscription 
(Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece and Sweden) or have only abolished it 
during the last decade or more recently (Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). Moreover, this rigidity does not permit an operability of EU armies 
(less than 4% of European troops are deployed on mission, compared with 16% in the US), 
nor does it allow national military budgets to have the flexibility needed to answer in an 
efficient way to the current cuts. As a  first response to the  budget cuts and rigidity of FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 10 
personnel expenditures, many countries cut their modernisation programmes and 
armaments projects, or delayed the retirement age of the current equipment programme. 
This practice, however  suitable  for  obtaining  quick savings, risks enlarging  the present 
deficit in EU military workability and, at the same time, increases the maintenance costs, 
thus neutralising the desired long-term savings. Facing public pressure on reducing military 
expenditure is not an easy task for European governments, and this trend is not reversible in 
the medium-term. Faced with this prospect, there is little appetite for pursuing European 
coherence in defence capabilities, leading to an increased incoherence of defence instruments 
and thus undermining the creation of an integrated European military system. The risk of 
mounting capacity incoherence represents an essential challenge for Europe: quite often, in 
fact, the cuts are led only by a short-term need of economisation, without analysing the long-
term implications of any  specific cut in a  European context. The next section will try to 
briefly analyse what are the main reasons behind these  unsustainable incoherencies in 
defence polices at EU level. 
3.2  Libya, a reality check for EU defence policy 
The lessons from Libya and NATO’s call for more multilateral cooperation in capacity-
building constitute a second external stimulus, of a magnitude similar to that of the Balkan 
wars on the launch of the EU security and defence policy. It has become a widespread 
opinion among observers that the absence of the EU in the Libyan crisis marked the de facto 
end of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This occurred less than 18 months 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, whose aim was to increase the effectiveness of 
the EU as a global actor. As Anand Menon points out, “the European Union stood on the 
sidelines and watched as France and the United Kingdom, acting within a NATO 
framework, intervened militarily on the Union’s doorstep” (Menon, 2011). Such dismay vis-
à-vis the EU’s incapacity to act as fully-fledged security provider is understandable. 
Whenever Europe displays titanic limitations in handling crises in its neighbourhood (e.g. in 
the Western Balkans), the EU is in the frontline of public criticism. Despite the innovations 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the experience accumulated after almost 10 years of 
operational experience in crisis management, the problem remains the same as it was at the 
outbreak of the Yugoslav wars: from a military point of view, the EU is not fit for purpose 
and cannot provide for its member states’  security needs. As a matter of fact, as NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen commented, “there is no lack of headquarters (…) what we 
lack in Europe is hardware”. These words seem highly pertinent in light of the problems 
encountered by European allies during the Libya campaign.  
The Libya crisis has shown that decreasing military spending and spreading competition 
across European states do not constitute a sustainable  approach  for Europe’s global 
ambitions. The lessons to be drawn for Europe are crystal-clear: small and uncoordinated 
militaries should pool and specialise to make savings, avoid waste of resources and optimise 
capabilities  in Europe’s scattered  defence sectors. Moreover, the  US reactions in the 
aftermath of the NATO campaign and the new defence strategy outlined by President 
Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in January 2012 confirmed that America is 
slowly but steadily disengaging from Europe and that future US  involvement in Europe’s 
neighbourhood is going to be limited at best (Marrone, 2012). Accordingly, as the US re-
orients its strategic military posture towards the Asian and Pacific theatres, the prospect of a 
shortage of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons is likely to push European leaders to 
consider unprecedented moves in the defence field. The Balkan wars (in particular, the 1999 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia) had marked a watershed in transatlantic relations, showing 
that the US would and could not look after Europe’s security at any price and revealing the 11 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
painful divide between the two sides of the Atlantic, both in terms of capabilities and 
strategic interests. This eventually led to the adoption of the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999) – 
to provide the EU with a rapid reaction mechanism by 2003 – and gave phenomenal impetus 
to the ESDP. Twelve years later, Operation Unified Protector in Libya not only exposed the 
little progress made by Europeans in improving their military capacities since 1999; it also 
substantiated the dangerous linkage between Europe’s loss of strategic relevance and the US 
frustration with the drop in NATO European member states’ defence spending.  
These two developments – the lessons from the Libya campaign and the US disengagement 
from Europe – together with the climate of financial austerity underpin NATO’s call for 
more multilateral cooperation to boost defence capacity-building. And since what happens 
in NATO is seldom without repercussions on the EU side of Brussels, the ‘smart defence’ 
agenda is pushing EU decision-makers to seek complementarities between transatlantic and 
European armaments cooperation.  
3.3  A transformed defence industry in a multi-polar world 
Finally, change taking place at the macro-level, and resulting in the transition towards a 
multi-polar world, is also exerting its pressure, raising paramount questions about the future 
of the global defence industry and Europe’s role in it. Strong economic growth and 
increasing prominence in global affairs have pushed emerging powers (China, Russia, India, 
Brazil, Turkey and South Africa) to strengthen their military capabilities, engage in major 
modernisation programmes, which resulted in soaring defence budgets. Security threats or 
conflicts  in neighbouring  countries, ambition to achieve great power status, prestige and 
sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis competing powers are the factors justifying military 
modernisation. In most cases, emerging powers have also sought to develop their domestic 
arms industries in order to reduce their dependence on imports, besides traditional 
diversification of arms purchase policies. The implications of these dynamics for Europe are 
hence twofold: first, the defence market is becoming more competitive (Gallois, 2012), as new 
local industries develop and access the market: in the medium term, Western companies are 
likely to face mounting competition from non-Western procurement. Second, if the current 
trend in military spending is not reversed, European companies will be forced to increase the 
number of foreign contractors to whom they sell their weapon  systems  in order to 
compensate for the fall in demand for military equipment due to budget cuts.  
4.  THE ECONOMICS OF EU MILITARY SPENDING 
The likelihood of an effective change in EU defence policy is strictly linked to the economic 
environment in which it operates: through the lens of economic analysis,  this section 
underlines the main weaknesses of the current European Defence Equipment Market 
(EDEM), which is breeding inefficiencies that now appear no longer acceptable. Improving 
this system represents, at the moment, the easiest and most immediate policy option aimed 
at allowing EU member states to rationalise their spending and obtain grater results with less 
(or equal) resources.  
4.1  An incomplete common defence market  
The actual European defence market is characterised by the presence of a multitude of 
national industries, each with its own forms of protection and related national interests. In 
2010, three-quarters of European defence investments were provided by European 
companies, the remaining quarter came from imports, in-house  Ministry of Defence FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 12 
programmes and outsourcing to the civil sector (ASD, 2010). But before analysing the 
elements composing this particular market (demand and supply), it is thus crucial to 
understand whether a ‘market’ really exists in Europe, that is, the conditions for a profitable 
exchange between demand and supply are present.  
Art. 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which excludes the 
production and export of arms from the rules governing the common  market, has 
represented for a long time the main obstacle preventing the creation of the EDEM, and 
explaining the reticence of member states in this field. Despite a precise provision in the 
TFEU and the express call from the European Commission to limit its application only to 
“strategic cases”, member states have abused this option in the past, enlarging its application 
and thus creating artificially the conditions for the existence of a large number of exceptions 
that would not be financially sustainable in open market conditions. To do so, each EU 
member had its national regulations  for defence procurement and export of arms: each 
member state required individual authorisation for any transnational movement of defence-
related components, thus creating formal barriers that cost more than €3 billion a year, 
according to European Commission estimates (O’Donnell, 2009).  
In recent years, however, the situation has slightly improved: in 2004, thanks to the work of 
the Greek Presidency of the European Union, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was set 
up in order to create major cooperation among member states in the defence sector and to 
facilitate the birth of the EDEM. In the period from July 2006 to December 2011, 700 contract 
offers were published on the EDA’s Electronic Bulletin (the Agency’s portal where European 
governments  and industries publish their contract opportunities) (EDA, 2012).  Even if it 
sounds impressive, most of the contracts awarded were not completed and contracts under 
€5.8 billion were not subject to EU competition.  
An additional bigger step forward was taken in 2009 thanks to two Directives: the Directive 
2009/43/EC and Directive 2009/81/EC, both effective after August 2011. The first one 
simplified the rules for transferring defence-related products among EU member states, 
simplifying the export authorisation procedures inside the EDEM (through the creation of 
general licences instead of individual ones),  thus aiming to restructure the defence 
companies in Europe in a more communitarian fashion (it should facilitate the creation of EU 
companies that would have production facilities located in various EU member states). The 
aim of the second Directive is to open the market in defence and security procurement, 
forcing in most cases EU Ministers of Defence to publish EU announcements for their tender, 
in order to reduce the exclusivity  of national companies and create a common market 
(between 2000 and 2004, less than 13% of all opportunities to tender for European defence 
procurement were published (EDA, 2010). Furthermore these two Directives ratify the 
entrance of the European  Commission (and its non-intergovernmental spirit) into the 
management of the defence market, after a long period in which its intervention was very 
limited. (It has been wary of denouncing the state in front of the Court for cases related to 
Art. 296). 
4.2  The demand side problems 
Having analysed the conditions and the inefficiencies in which the exchanges take place in 
EU defence market, we now look at the two components of this market: on the demand side, 
national governments represent the unquestioned leading factors in establishing expenditure 
policies, as shown  in  Figure  4  and previously discussed. Indeed, member states usually 
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manufacturing industries, and maintain in this way the complete sovereign control of 
national knowledge in defence production. NATO, despite its primary role in international 
defence organisation and the provision of a platform for the cooperation of member states, 
has not succeeded in convincing European states to overcome or at least reduce the national 
political factors. Also the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy and of 
the European Defence Agency have not significantly altered this structural aspect, since their 
impact has  proved to be insufficient to generate common procedures or  convergence  in 
crucial sectors of armament cooperation,  such as competition, procurement and  export. 
Simply looking at the data shows how European collaborative procurement represents the 
most frequently used cooperation forum by member states, but also how this mechanism has 
not particularly taken off, since its share of total procurement has remained stable around 
20% in last four years (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Collaboration in defence equipment procurement expenditures 
 
Source: EDA, 2011. 
Even after the EDA institution and the consequent shift from a pure intergovernmental and 
ad-hoc system to a more systemic and EU-managed one, the 'juste retour' (pure returns) 
principle has remained the main approach in the intentions of the MS; according to this 
principle, the industry of each participating nation would receive a share of the work that 
corresponds to the financial contribution of the related government. Even  if  this system 
assures, in theory, a redistribution of the activity according to the capabilities of each nation, 
the final result has often been quite inefficient, since it has seriously reduced the flexibility of 
the various programmes and, above all, since the distribution has been made not according 
to the capabilities, but to the political considerations, it has decreased instead of increased 
the efficiency of the project (Schmitt, 2003).  
4.3  The supply side problems 
This lack of consolidation on the demand side has inevitably led to a disaggregated EU 
industrial defence system composed of a multitude of national industries, each with their 
national interests (some still under the control of national governments). In this context, the 
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supply-side structure of the EDEM  is composed of  about 20 large companies (prime 
contractors), a second group of around 100 medium companies (usually subcontracted and 
specialised in subsystem components, electronics, etc.) and finally by a vast number of 
specialised producers of components and suppliers of services (electrical and electronic 
equipment, mechanical engineering, etc.) that operate at the margin of the defence sectors  
composed usually of small and medium enterprises. The position of the EU defence industry 
in the global market is certainly remarkable, placing second after the US: in 2010, 44 
companies out of the top 100  arms producers are EU based, covering about 30% of the 
world’s arms sales (excluding Chinese companies).  
Table 2. World defence industry 
RANK  COMPANY  COUNTRY  SECTORS  ARMS SALES 
 ($ mil) 
1  Lockheed Martin  US  Ac El Mi Sp  33.4 
2  BAE Systems  UK  A Ac El MV Mi SA/A Sh  33.3 
3  Boeing  US  Ac El Mi Sp  32.3 
4  Northrop Grumman  US  Ac El Mi Ser Sh Sp  27.0 
5  General Dynamics  US  A El MV SA/A Sh  25.6 
6  Raytheon  US  El Mi  23.1 
6  BAE Systems Inc.  US  A El MV SA/A  19.3 
7  EADS  Trans-EU  Ac El Mi Sp  15.9 
8  Finmeccanica  Italy  A Ac El MV Mi SA/A  13.3 
9  L-3 Communications  US  El Ser  13.0 
10  United Technologies  US  Ac El Eng  11.1 
11  Thales  France  A El MV Mi SA/A Sh  10.2 
12  SAIC  US  Ser Comp(MV)  8.0 
13  Computer Sciences Corporation  US  Ser  6.1 
14  Honeywell  US  El  5.4 
15  KBR[e]  US  Ser  5.0 
Key to abbreviations: A = artillery; Ac = aircraft; El = electronics; Eng = engines; Mi = missiles; MV = military vehicles; 
SA/A = small arms/ammunition; Ser = services; Sh = ships; Sp = space; Oth = other. 
Source: SIPRI (2011).         
Table 2 clearly shows how the matchless primacy is awarded to US companies, representing 
60% of the world market: however, the US dominance is even more visible by comparing the 
number of companies in the top 25 firms, of which only 9 are not US-based (Figure 5). 15 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
Figure 5. US vs. EU defence industry 
 
Source: SIPRI (2011). 
The great relevance of sovereign interests and nationally biased preferences of MS military 
spending has led to a situation in which the defence industry in the EU is mainly a reflection 
of the size of different national military budgets (Figure 6). The big 4 national industries (UK, 
France, Italy and Germany) cover  around 70% of the whole EU defence market (90% 
considering also the trans-European firms such as EADS and MBDA). This situation of high 
concentration, however, does not reflect a comparable concentration in the number of the 
firms: two-thirds of the EU defence firms, in fact, are outside these four countries, resulting 
in a sizeable dispersion and in a fragmented structure that is ineffective from the economic 
point of view. To complete the description of the situation, it must be underlined that at the 
moment, only considering the top 50 EU defence companies, there are 13 producers of 
aircrafts, 10 of missiles, 9 of military vehicles, 8 of ships. This situation appears inefficient if 
compared to those of the US where, with a defence market two times bigger, there are 12 
producers of aircraft, 5 of missiles, 8 of military vehicles and just 4 of ships.  
This higher concentration is mainly the result of a precise political choice made by the US 
Department of Defence in 1993, after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Edwards, 2011). In a context 
of planned reductions in the defence budget, the top 15 US defence firms were requested to 
pursue consolidating policies in order to survive, thanks to the higher economies of scale 
obtainable in this way.  
In Europe, in the early 1990s, the consolidation process took place primarily at national level 
with the creation of national champions (Bergstrom et al., 2008). The resulting companies, 
however, now appear not big enough to compete efficiently in today’s defence market; in 
this scenario, only EADS represent an effective product  of positive efforts made by EU 
governments to pursue merging policies at European level. In most of the cases, in fact, 
when European firms decided to cooperate, the favourite strategy was to  set up 
multinational ad-hoc consortia (Eurofighter) or joint ventures (MBDA, Agusta Westland), 
both of which have permitted national firms to maintain their national identity. Accepting 
the acquisition by another EU member state’s firm has been, in fact, a quasi-unacceptable 
policy for most of the member states. Moreover many industries (notably Finmeccanica in 
Italy and Thales in France) still have the state as a shareholder, or are controlled indirectly 
via special rights, such as the ‘golden share’ in UK, allowing the national government to 
orient firms’ strategy. In this situation of few fully consolidated EU transnational firms, a 
partial exception is represented by Thales, created via the merger of the French Thomson-
CSF and Dassault Electronique with the British Racal Electronics. 
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Figure 6. Defence industry in the EU: MS national companies 
 
Source: SIPRI (2011). 
This situation is evidently justifiable from a political point of view: the loss of sovereignty 
over  defence capabilities represents a potential high risk, since the rebuilding process of 
competences in this field is a costly and long activity. However, this situation is doubly 
uneconomical: on the  one  hand, it represents a strong limitation on pursuing the  much-
needed process of consolidation (similar to that implemented in the US after the cold war), 
which is fundamental in a sector with high economies of scale, and thus it prevents the 
creation of EU defence industrial giants able to compete successfully with US counterparts 
(Table 2). On the other hand, it does not even permit the exploitation of the advantages of 
competition  created by the presence of similar industries, due to the nationally biased 
preferences of MS military spending.  
The high fragmentation of the EU defence market leads unambiguously to the impossibility 
to gain from the economies of scale or scope: despite the presence of high fixed cost in the 
defence sector, the EU industries are not able to reduce them by increasing their production, 
thus generating higher profits. Table 1 shows that the situation is completely different in the 
US: the presence of a larger common market, in fact, allows the size of firms to increase, 
creating big world players capable not only of operating with higher profits, but, above all, 
of competing in the global defence market. At the moment, in fact, despite the relative 
important contribution to EU exports (the aeronautical industry represents 2.6% of the EU’s 
total external exports),  the ability of  the EU defence industries to penetrate the external 
market is limited compared to their US counterpart. The cause of the fragmentation in the 
supply side is the natural result of fragmentation in the demand side of the market: the high 
number of national firms producing too many types of similar equipment, which are 
produced at too small a scale of output for each national market. This dilemma is the natural 
result of a market organisation that is not based at the EU level, but mainly on a national basis.  
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
0 
10000 
20000 
30000 
40000 
50000 
60000 
UK  Italy  France  Germany  Spain  Trans 
European 
Other 
U
S
D
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
Total arms sales (left axis) 
# of firms (right axis) 17 |THE EU BETWEEN SMART DEFENCE AND P&S: MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
5.  THE ROAD AHEAD: FROM GHENT TO CHICAGO, CAN 
EUROPE MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY? 
Although national defence establishments may oppose this process to protect their short-
term interests, we can expect the EU debate on pooling & sharing to intensify following the 
NATO impulse. This is an excellent opportunity for the Ghent Framework and the NATO 
smart defence agenda to cross each other’s paths, especially after the North Atlantic Council 
Summit in Chicago (May 2012). In fact, despite the hurdles encountered on the way to 
implement military integration, the EU multilateral setting is well suited to address NATO’s 
proposal for greater multilateral cooperation to solve Europe’s capability problems.  
To attain this target, it is all-important that the revival of the Ghent Framework respects 
three ‘political’ conditions: it must avoid politically sensitive issues, act in accordance with 
the transatlantic agenda and keep public expectations low.  
Avoiding politically sensitive issues means that the EU P&S should not get entangled with 
the irksome debate over the establishment of an EU military HQ and command and control 
structures. Linking the two issues, in fact, would upset some member states that oppose this 
development and may jeopardise progress in capacity-building.  Acting according to the 
transatlantic agenda entails the implementation of an ‘EU way to smart defence’ respecting 
the three ‘D’s’ (no duplication, no decoupling, no discrimination) that underlie EU-NATO 
relations. Finally, by keeping expectations low, decision-makers  must  be careful not to 
confuse P&S with the beginning of a process leading to the creation of a European army.  
If these conditions can be respected, the implementation of the Ghent Framework would go 
through three stages:   
  Re-modulation of strategic hardware provision strategy,   
  Designing EU common R&D programmes and  
  Creating an effective and Single EU defence market for non-strategic equipment.  
5.1  Re-modulation of strategic hardware provision strategy 
The inefficiencies of the EU defence system have a greater impact on the provision of 
strategic heavy weapon systems (tanks, ships, aircrafts, etc.), due to the presence of high 
fixed costs in the production line. However, in this sector it is highly unlikely that MS will 
accept putting national defence capacities into a ‘common pot’, which would result in an 
unacceptable loss of strategic autonomy (in a sector where rebuilding capacities lost would 
be extremely costly). Nevertheless, it is also true that defence budgetary constraints would 
result in reduced room for manoeuvre, this in turn generating loss of autonomy.  
With  regard  to  the demand side, the path to solving  the problem has been already 
undertaken, even if without sufficient commitment: tighter cooperation represents the most 
suitable policy to maintain national strategic considerations in the defence sector and allows 
member states to equip themselves with capacities that they would not be able to acquire on 
their own at acceptable costs. However, the current cooperation fora (OCCAR, EDA, bilateral 
agreements, letters of intents, ad-hoc consortia, etc.) create inefficiencies and confusion. The 
choice of a more standardised and agreed mechanism for setting common EU instruments is 
thus needed: as suggested by Biscop &  Coelmont (2011), the first use of the PESCO 
instrument provided by the Lisbon Treaty could be crucial, since it would combine the 
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modularity and  cooperation. Despite the view of Lt. Gen. David Leakey (former Director 
General of the European Union Military Staff), that “most military capabilities assigned to 
the existing PESCOs are minimal and do not add anything substantial to European defence” 
(Fiott,  2011), a more efficient use of PESCO could be found in those strategic hardware 
components.  The window offered by Directive 2009/81/EC, in fact, allows for a wide 
opening of markets for such type of defence equipment procurement, thus facilitating the 
use of PESCO. Another step forward would be a clarification of what exactly PESCO is. 
Leakey argues that, despite its ambitious potential, the different forms of PESCO suggest 
that a clearer definition of its use could offer a more solid basis for future cooperation under 
this framework (Fiott, 2011). 
That being said, coordination solely on the demand side would not be sufficient to obtain 
significant savings: the creation of EADS (and the subsidiary MBDA, Eurocopter  and 
Eurofighter), must serve as a success story to be emulated in other defence sectors. At the 
moment, in fact, aerospace is the only European strategic industry characterised by 
decreasing costs, high R&D intensity and technology spin-offs (Ecorys, 2010). Furthermore, 
this sector is only partly affected by the inefficiencies afflicting a large percentage of small 
firms, little exploitation of economies of scale and overcapacity, as their magnitude is not 
comparable to other sectors. The land equipment sector, for instance, is virtually completely 
lacking in any joint ventures at the EU level (with the exception of the JV between Nexter 
and BAE), which results in the presence of as many EU producers as in the US:  this has 
produced low R&D spending and low labour productivity (TNO, 2009). A similar situation 
exists in the naval sector. Despite the presence of four European firms as world top suppliers 
of warships, overcapacity, duplication of industrial capabilities and a high number of small 
firms prevent the sector from becoming competitive (TNO, 2009). Giant steps could be taken 
at the political level in leading a “supply consolidation process”: the lesson learned by the 
same American consolidation policies during the 1990s could overcome private sector 
resistance, for instance by exchanging consolidation with a higher percentage of contracts 
awarded. This would be a win-win situation, since the greater efficiency obtained through 
these policies would result in more economical choice for MS.  
Figure 7. Defence budget R&D in selected countries 
 
Source: OECD (2011). 
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5.2  Designing EU common R&D programmes 
Development and production of strategic hardware is linked to R&D programmes. Figure 7 
and Figure 8 clearly show that the current level of R&D in the EU is insufficient and, even 
more importantly, highly inefficient due to the economies of scale present in this field. 
Moreover, since this sector is subject to obsolescence, a reduction in the public orders by EU 
countries resulting from budget cuts could lead to a loss of competitive skills, human capital 
and know-how with respect to the US industries or to those of emerging countries, hence 
producing negative consequences in the long term. Therefore, it appears essential to 
maintain the actual technological competencies, capable of assuring a strategic independence 
of EU defence in the coming years. More pooling of the R&D part of the defence budget is a 
key priority to increase the effectiveness of capacity-building. 
Until now, member states have preferred to limit their joint research programmes to bilateral 
or multilateral (EDA) intergovernmental initiatives. A strengthening of synergies between 
the Commission, member states and the EDA would facilitate the launch of new joint 
activities and optimise resources under the umbrella of the Framework Programme for 
Research and Development (FPRD), which currently lacks a defence wing. For the period 
from 2007 to 2013, in fact, the new security budget inside the FRPD (obtained with a 
considerable political effort by the Commission) amounted to  only  2% of the  whole 
allocation, an almost insignificant €1 billion out of €50 billion (Liberti, 2011).  The new system 
should be designed as follows: member states would define the top priorities for the EU in 
the coming years, indicating the strategic aspects to be developed. In these early stages, the 
Commission and the EDA should not be involved in what should remain a member state-led 
debate on the European security strategy, outlining the EU’s role in the global security field 
and, as a consequence, the defence needs for the coming decade.   
Once the R&D priorities are set, the EDA will make its own expertise available to define the 
structure of the research programmes, which will then be launched by the Commission. 
Thanks to its long-standing experience accumulated in the management of Framework 
Programmes, the Commission is certainly the best structure to ensure effective project 
management. In this context, the principle of ‘juste retour’ must be abandoned, as it would 
not allow the maximising of gains obtained by collaborative programmes. A possible step in 
this direction would be to strengthen the EDA sphere of influence, letting the EDA map 
member states’ core competences in selected defence industries in addition to the traditional 
mapping of member state defence needs. Only by having this complete picture of the EU 
defence sector can the EDA be in a position to set up collaborative programmes that are not 
based on ‘juste retour’, but on the specialisation principle, hence obtaining gains  in 
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Figure 8. European equipment procurement and R&D/R&T  
 
Source: EDA (2011). 
5.3  Single EU defence market for non-strategic equipment 
In contrast to strategic procurement, procurement of low-level equipment such as munitions, 
arms and war material (clothing, kits, personnel equipment, etc.) can be easily managed at 
the EU level without threatening national autonomy. The financial crisis has given some EU 
countries the opportunity to increase their specialisation in specific military areas, especially 
for middle-and-small-size countries that cannot maintain full-spectrum forces. For instance, 
the Czech Republic focused on NBC (nuclear/biological/chemical) protection and electronic 
warfare, Luxembourg increased its specialisation in reconnaissance and Latvia in medical 
response and engineering support (Moling & Brune, 2011). This trend could point the way 
towards a more efficient European provision of non-strategic equipment, in order to fully 
benefit from the Ricardian lesson of “mutual gains from specialisation”. 
To achieve this result, it is essential that European states clearly define the nature of ‘non-
strategic equipment’, leaving no room for ambiguity. In this context an important role can be 
played both by the European Commission through its non-governmental approach already 
developed in other sectors, and by the EDA. Thanks to the specific industry knowledge and 
the experience accumulated in recent years, the latter could obtain technical “discrimen” (i.e. 
distinctive features) in defining this kind of equipment. Once this was achieved, the EDA 
would have to boost its standardisation process in this field, thus elaborating distinctive and 
best features of these products in order to launch an EU common procurement initiative, or at 
least, institutionalise an EU common framework to which all the EU private firms could refer 
to in defining their bidding strategies. Especially in the non-strategic equipment sector, in 
fact, the Materiel Standardisation Group (composed by member states‘ standardisation 
experts) could quickly achievable  remarkable results, and perhaps much more budget 
savings for MoDs than long processes to define common sophisticated technical equipment. 
For complete success, it is crucial that this procedure shifts, more and more, from a pure 
intergovernmental approach to a more communitarian one, in order to reduce the national 
bias that could arise in the defining process. In fact, once the specification of these non- 
strategic products was defined (thereby eliminating the national interest), the related market 
could become fully EU-integrated and could apply  all the basic  economic rules of 
international trade, thus leading to gains in terms of efficiency and reduced costs for all EU 
countries.  
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SECTOR  POLICY  ACTORS 
 
STRATEGIC 
EQUIPMENT 
PESCO as standardised and           
flexible mechanism for cooperation  
Consolidation of land equipment   
and naval industrial sectors 
Member States 
Member States & 
private industries  
 
 
 
R&D  
PROGRAMM
ES 
Definition of the EU role in global 
security arena 
Mapping needs/competences of 
the MS in key sectors 
Member States  
 
European Defence 
Agency, European 
Commission and 
private industries  
Definition of common R&D 
programmes 
 
 
NON- 
STRATEGIC 
EQUIPMENT 
Effective implementation of two 
directives on EU defence market 
Definition of common standards at 
EU level 
Member States 
Specialisation and greater 
competition  
MS, EDA and 
private industries  
MS, EDA, 
Commission 
To assure the effective functioning of the EDEM for non-strategic equipment, the basic steps 
have already been taken: the two Directives, the creation of EDA’s Electronic Bulletin Board, 
the elaboration of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement and the Code of Best Practice 
in the Supply Chain for industry-to-industry. Together, they provide the ground elements 
assuring a workable environment for these kinds of policies. Thus, the only extra element 
needed is the political will allowing a real and systemic functioning of these instruments: a 
choice perhaps that cannot be postponed due the current state of member state budgets.  
Table 3. Suggested policies 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
   FALEG & GIOVANNINI | 22 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The distribution of power in the international system is changing: despite an unquestionable 
US supremacy in the defence sector (Figure 9), emerging powers are going for big defence 
deals and increasing their defence budgets, thus turning part of their economic outreach into 
force projection capacity. In this context, it has become rather clear that EU member states 
cannot act as global players by relying on wobbly national finances. EU countries run the 
very real risk of losing  their  strategic relevance in the coming years, since budget cuts 
seriously undermine their ability to meet future challenges in the defence realm. The EU 
should take advantage of the window of opportunity provided by the Lisbon Treaty in terms 
of enhanced cooperation and by the NATO smart defence approach to rationalise its defence 
market. A revitalisation of the Ghent Framework should lead to greater cooperation in the 
provision of strategic hardware, pooling of resources for R&D programmes and the effective 
realisation of an EDEM of non-strategic equipment.  
 
Figure 9. Global military spending 
 
Source: SIPRI (2011). 
This paper has claimed that “this time is different” and that pooling and sharing is no longer 
a taboo subject  due to three external stimuli: the impact of the economic crisis in the 
eurozone on defence budgets,  the military lessons from Libya and NATO’s  (US) call for 
multilateral  cooperation on defence capacity-building and the  distinct  linkage between 
transformation in the global defence industry and  the transition towards a multi-polar 
world. It also contended that the successful operationalisation  of the Ghent Framework 
depends on the de-politicisation of the debate and on the link (and complementarity) with 
the NATO agenda. Finally, our study suggests that a roadmap for P&S should rely on 
essentially three pillars. In the first pillar (strategic equipment), a focus on ‘best practices’ 
(e.g. the role of EADS in the aerospace sector) could produce important spillovers and create 
emulation effects in heavy military equipment for land forces and in the naval sector. The 
latter, in particular, would prove most useful, as a result of EU activism, in contributing to 
maritime security (such as Operation Atlanta) and in light of the increasing importance of 
naval operations within the CSDP. In the second pillar (R&D programmes), a better division 
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of labour between member states (in charge of defining the ‘strategic priorities’ for the years 
ahead through the revision of the European Security Strategy), EDA (tasked with 
operationalising EU strategic needs through designing R&D programmes) and the European 
Commission (the ‘project manager’  or executor) could create unprecedented synergies, 
especially if states commit to abandon the principle of ‘juste retour’. Finally, in the third 
pillar (non-strategic equipment), the Ricardian lesson of ‘mutual gains from specialisation’ 
could provide the EU with more efficient, cost-effective and better-integrated armies.      
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